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Abstract
This paper provides new ﬁrm-level evidence of the impact of ﬁnancial frictions on
international trade. First, by drawing on a unique instrument to capture ﬁnancial
frictions at a ﬁrm level, we address concerns about endogenous measures of ﬁrms' ﬁ-
nancial constraints. Second, we empirically test the role of distance and long trading
time in reinforcing the negative eﬀect of ﬁnancial frictions on ﬁrms' exports. We use
detailed customs and balance sheet data combined to a unique dataset on payment
incidents among ﬁrms to conduct this empirical analysis. We ﬁnd that ﬁnancial fric-
tions signiﬁcantly reduce ﬁrm's export sales. Our estimations show a signiﬁcant eﬀect
of distance and trading time in reinforcing the negative eﬀect of ﬁnancial frictions on
export sales.
JEL Classiﬁcation: D22, F10, F14.
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1 Introduction
Exporting involves higher liquidity needs than selling domestically and part of these extra
needs are due to higher costs that might be overcome by access to external ﬁnance. These
additional costs partly cover costs associated to longer shipping time. Thus ﬁnancial health
is a key determinant for ﬁrm export activities.
This paper investigates how ﬁnancial frictions impact ﬁrms' foreign sales and especially
for ﬁrms that export to long distance export markets. Throughout this paper ﬁnancial
frictions represent any type of friction that may aﬀect ﬁrms' access to external ﬁnance.
This term is relatively broad and encompasses credit constraints as well as dependence to
external ﬁnance. For ﬁrms, having access to external ﬁnance is a key condition to bear all
the upfront costs of production. This is especially true for exporters for whom these costs
are higher and the time elapsed between the production and revenues from the sale of this
production is longer.
To conduct our analysis we process in three steps. First, we exploit various measures of
ﬁrms' ﬁnancial frictions to conﬁrm previous ﬁndings on ﬁnancial constraints and exports.
Using a rich dataset we perform our analysis with several measures of ﬁnancial frictions
and ﬁnd that exporters that enjoy better levels of ﬁnancial health export bigger volumes.
Second, we address the issue of endogeneity by using a unique instrument for measur-
ing ﬁnancial frictions at a ﬁrm-level. Firms' exporting activities and ﬁnancial indicators
might be jointly determined and then raise an endogeneity bias. Having access to data
on payment failures among ﬁrms we use them to instrument ﬁnancial frictions variables.
Namely, we use payment failures generated by trading partners as an exogenous measure
of ﬁnancial shock hitting the exporting ﬁrm. Thus, we obtain an exogenous measure of
ﬁrms' ﬁnancial constraints that is used as an instrument and we tackle the endogeneity
issue. The results provided by this instrumentation strategy are very similar to the ones
obtained by the baseline OLS estimation. Third, we complement our analysis of the role
of ﬁnancial constraints on export activities by focusing on the speciﬁc roles of distance and
trading time on exporters witnessing ﬁnancial frictions. Our results suggest that amongst
exporters facing ﬁnancial diﬃculties, those that export to faraway destinations (or to long
exporting time markets) reduce their export sales more than the ones exporting to closer
destinations. These results show the eﬀect of distance or trading time in reinforcing the
negative eﬀect of ﬁnancial frictions and suggest that exporters decide to reduce their ex-
ports to the costliest destinations. We test the robusness of our results performing diﬀerent
models of estimation, we especially perform additional regressions on a subsample contain-
ing only ﬁrms exporting to a single foreign market.
Financial frictions and exports. Exporters have speciﬁc liquidity needs that may
reinforce the eﬀect of ﬁnancial frictions on their export activities. Unlike domestic sell-
ers exporters incur additional costs of two types: ﬁxed and variable costs. Fixed costs
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are various, they encompass costs due to serving a new destination. These latter include
adaptation costs to adapt the product sold to a new foreign market (studying the market
potential, building and maintaining a distribution network, etc.). Exporters also incur
ﬁxed costs associated to each export shipping, as costs of ﬁlling customs declarations. Fi-
nally, they incur additional variable costs due to higher transportation costs -explained by
longer shipping time- higher risks and duties. All of those additional costs translate into
higher liquidity needs for exporters and therefore higher vulnerability to ﬁnancial frictions.
The literature dealing with ﬁnancial frictions and exports has mostly focused on the role
of ﬁxed costs while little evidence exists on variable costs. Diﬃculties into ﬁnancing vari-
able costs should aﬀect export volumes to a destination. This is exactly the impact of
ﬁnancial frictions on export sales we study in this empirical analysis. Intuitively, exporters
facing ﬁnancial frictions would have diﬃculties to ﬁnance variable costs associated to ex-
port activities and would therefore reduce their volume of export sales to a destination.
Theoretically, this mechanism has been modelled and studied by Manova (2009) who esti-
mates that most of the impact of credit constraints on trade happens through the volume
of exports. Empirically, this model has been tested but results remain inconclusive. A few
papers conﬁrm the result from Manova (2013) while others do not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant impact
of ﬁnancial constraints on export sales (Berman and Héricourt (2010), Stiebale (2011)).
To provide new evidence on this question we focus our analysis on export sales (i.e on the
intensive margin of trade) and do not study the role of ﬁnancial frictions on the entry and
exit on foreign markets (i.e the extensive margin) or other types of export dimensions (des-
tinations portfolio, number of products exported, etc.). We then complement this initial
analysis by studying the speciﬁc roles of distance and into reinforcing the eﬀect of ﬁnancial
frictions on export sales. Distance largely determines the amount of variable trade costs
which is why long distance destinations are costlier to serve than others. By investigating
the role of distance on export sales of exporters facing ﬁnancial frictions we want to shed
light on this particular reinforcing eﬀect.
Related literature. Our research relates to the growing literature at the boundary
between international trade and ﬁnance. This literature has become seminal with works
studying the relationship between ﬁnancial development and international trade at a coun-
try level. Bardhan and Kletzer (1987) provide a model of international trade in which
ﬁnancial development oﬀers a source of comparative advantage to countries. Empirical
works complement this theory and show that countries with higher ﬁnancial development
have a comparative advantage in ﬁnancially vulnerable sectors (Beck (2002), Ju and Wei
(2011)). At the sectoral level, Rajan and Zingales (1998) conﬁrm the aggregate ﬁnding
from Bardhan and Kletzer (1987).
Most directly, this paper contributes to the literature on ﬁnancial constraints and in-
ternational trade. Chaney (2013) provides a theoretical model that incorporates ﬁnancial
constraints and ﬁrm heterogeneity (this is an adaptation of the seminal framework from
Melitz (2003)). This model predicts that a restricted access to external ﬁnance constitutes
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an additional obstacle to exporting activities that only the most productive ﬁrms would
be able to overcome. Manova (2013) proposes an alternative theoretical framework that
models three channels through which credit constraints aﬀect ﬁrms' exports. The ﬁrst one
deals with the selection of ﬁrms into domestic production, the second one deals with the
selection of producing ﬁrms into exporting and the last one deals with the level of ﬁrm
export sales. Our work provides new empirical estimations of this latter channel.
The previous theoretical ﬁnding is complemented by several empirical studies at a
ﬁrm-level. They suggest that ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms are less likely to export, to
fewer destinations, fewer volumes and lower varieties (Greenaway et al. (2007), Muûls
(2008), Manova et al. (2014), Minetti and Zhu (2011), Askenazy et al. (2015)). If most
of the papers in this literature agree on the impact of ﬁnancial frictions on ﬁrms selection
into exporting, their results diﬀer in terms of the impact of ﬁrms' ﬁnancial frictions on
the level of export sales. Berman and Héricourt (2010) explore the role of ﬁrms ' ﬁnancial
health measured by liquidity and leverage ratios on exports over 5,000 ﬁrms in 9 developing
countries. They do not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant impact of ﬁnancial frictions on export survival
and on the level of exports. Stiebale (2011) also concludes to an insigniﬁcant impact of
ﬁrms' ﬁnancial frictions on export activity.
Apart from Minetti and Zhu (2011) who provide an instrumental variable for ﬁrms'
ﬁnancial frictions, all the papers cited above use endogenous measures of ﬁrms' ﬁnancial
frictions, meaning that they exploit ﬁrms' ﬁnancial frictions indicators that are endoge-
nous to ﬁrms' export strategies. They exploit variables such as liquidity or leverage ratios
that are interpreted as indicators signalling a limited access to external capital while these
indicators may also signal a high demand for capital to develop ﬁrms' exports. Therefore
the interpretation of liquidity or leverage ratios as ﬁnancial frictions may be misleading.
Besides, being able to export to some markets may be interpreted as a positive signal by
ﬁnancers, alleviate ﬁnancial constraints and inﬂuence the value of these ratios, inducing
reverse causalitu. Our work thus extends the literature by providing a unique exogenous
measure to acurately capture ﬁrms' ﬁnancial frictions.
Another strand of empirical studies focuses on the role of ﬁnancial frictions on exports
during crises. Although our study does not cover those speciﬁc time periods it relates to
parts of the results found in this literature. Bricongne et al. (2012) and Behrens et al.
(2013) exploit respectively French and Belgian ﬁrm-level data and ﬁnd the negative eﬀect
of ﬁrms' ﬁnancial frictions on exports was higher during the recent ﬁnancial crisis for ﬁrms
in ﬁnancially dependent sectors.
Finally, by exploring the speciﬁc roles of distance and trading time on ﬁnancially con-
strained exporters, we contribute to another strand of the literature studying trading time
as a trade barrier. Throughout the paper we deﬁne trading time as the time elapsed to
export products, it mainly includes shipping time and time spent at customs. As brieﬂy
mentioned above even in the very globalized world we live now, distance and trading
3
 
Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2016.49
time still matter for international trade. Indeed, in spite of the decrease in international
transportation costs, these may impact signiﬁcantly margin rates for some companies and
inﬂuence their decisions. Papers exploring the role of shipping time on bilateral trade
conclude that longer distance or shipping time negatively aﬀect both the probability of ex-
porting and the volumes of exports. Hummels (2001) estimates that each extra day spent
in transport reduces the probability that the U.S will import from this country. Djankov
et al. (2012) exploits World Bank Doing Business Indicators and ﬁnds that each extra day
spent at the customs reduces trade by more than 1%.
More recently a few papers have linked the role of shipping time to the negative impact
of ﬁnancial frictions. At the country-level Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2013) ﬁnds that the negative
eﬀect of ﬁnancial frictions on trade is reinforced by distance. Our results provide micro
evidence of this latter estimate. Berman et al. (2013) also show that bilateral aggregate
trade during the ﬁnancial crisis was decreasing more the longer the distance between origin
and destination countries. At the ﬁrm-level, Feenstra et al. (2015) and Manova et al (2014)
show that credit constraints reduce export more the longer the shipping time.
Our paper aims at providing new insights regarding the impact of ﬁrms' ﬁnancial fric-
tions on export sales and therefore contributes to the literature presented above. The
remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the data. Sec-
tion 3 motivates and details our empirical strategy. Section 4 presents the results and
section 5 details additional results. Section 6 concludes.
2 Data and measurement
2.1 Sources of data
To conduct our empirical analysis we combine six types of data, ﬁrm balance sheet data,
ﬁrm-level trade ﬂows, ﬁrms payment failures, ﬁrms ﬁnancial links geographic distances and
exporting time indicators.
Balance sheet data. Our ﬁrst source of data is the French balance sheet data BRN
(Bénéﬁces Réels Normaux), it is an oﬃcial dataset relying on data from the French ﬁscal
administration. This dataset is built by the French statistical institute (INSEE) on records
of ﬁscal declarations from domestic French ﬁrms. It includes ﬁrms from all sectors and size
classes since there is no threshold on the number of employees. Firms with at least a 763 K
euros yearly turnover (230K euros for services) are obliged to send their balance sheet to the
French ﬁscal administration and smaller ﬁrms may send it as well if they choose the normal
tax regime. This dataset provides us information on ﬁnancial variables, employment, value
added, the sector, the year and all balance sheet items. The BRN original dataset includes
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around 60% of the total number of French ﬁrms but it is very representative as it covers on
around 94% of the French GDP. 1 This database has another great advantage by including
both small and large ﬁrms. This database contains information regarding the main activity
of ﬁrms and since we focus our analysis on exporters we have restricted the sample to ﬁrms
having exported at least once over the studied period (1995-2007). We also restrict our
analysis to exporters in manufacturing and services sectors excluding wholesale trade and
ﬁnancial activities. One might think that ﬁrms operating in services sectors may be less
aﬀected by a restricted access to ﬁnance since costs associated to transport and distance
are lower. However, Crozet and Millet (2014) provide evidence that most French exporters
belonging to the services sectors also export goods. We exclude wholesale traders since
we expect them to have diﬀerent export strategies from the other exporters which export
what they produce. We also exclude ﬁnancial activities because this sector presents very
speciﬁc issues regarding ﬁnancial frictions. We have also cleaned the original dataset by
dropping ﬁrms with negative assets or other extreme observations.
Trade ﬂows. Our second source of ﬁrm-level data comes from the French customs. They
record export ﬂows with product, ﬁrm and destination dimensions. Exports must be de-
clared to French Customs if one of the two following requirements is satisﬁed. If the
destination is not in the EU, all exports above 1,000 euros or 1,000 kilograms must be
declared. If destination is a EU member state the declaration is compulsory if the yearly
cumulated value of exports to the other EU member states is larger than 150,000 euros.
Each recorded trade ﬂow contains information on the value and the quantity traded. Since
we do not exploit details at the product level, we sum trade ﬂows at the ﬁrm, year and
destination dimension. We easily match these trade ﬂows with the balance sheet data
thanks to the ﬁrm unique identiﬁer (SIREN number) on a yearly basis.
Payment incidents. We then complement these two ﬁrst sources of data with a unique
dataset produced by the Banque de France. This information come from French banks
which are legally obliged to report any payment default on trade creditors to the "Système
Interbancaire de Télécompensation" within four business days. These payment incidents
are gathered by the Banque de France which makes this information available to French
commercial banks during one year.2 Any single French commercial bank has therefore
access to this information and may use it to evaluate creditworthiness of ﬁrms granting
for a loan. Payment Incidents can be interpreted as an indicator of credit constraints: a
ﬁrm which has failed to pay over the last 12 months would have more diﬃculties to get a
new loan or would get a smaller amount of loan (Aghion et al. 2012). With this unique
information we are able to precisely measure ﬁnancial distress at the ﬁrm-level and we
1see Eaton et al. (2011) or Berman et al. (2015) for more details on this database
2This dataset has been previously used by Askenazy et al. (2015), Bricongne et al. (2012) and Aghion
et al. (2012).
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build an exogenous measure of ﬁrms' ﬁnancial frictions by taking the partners' payment
incidents which should impact the related ﬁrm ﬁnancial health.
LIFI survey. To control for ﬁrms group belonging, we complement our dataset with
data from the Financial Links between Enterprises Survey (LIFI survey) produced by the
French national statistical institute INSEE. This dataset provides us information on the
groups of enterprises operating in France and allows us to identify if a ﬁrm is a head of a
group, a subsidiary, is considered in the periphery of the group (it is the case if the group is
a minor shareholder of the given ﬁrm) or is independent. This information is also available
on a yearly basis, we therefore match it with our previous data using the ﬁrm identiﬁer
by year. This survey has a good coverage but small and very small enterprises may be
underrepresented. This should not be a concern in our case since small ﬁrms do not export
much anyway and, besides, may not be covered by the French customs database if their
exports are under the thresholds.
Geographic distances. To be able to study the speciﬁc role of trading time on ﬁnan-
cially constrained exporters, we exploit two alternative proxies. First, we use a geographic
distance variable. We extract the variable of geographical distances from the CEPII dis-
tance database. This variable simply gives the geodesic distance between the most impor-
tant cities of the origin and destination countries.3
Exporting time. To complete measures of trading time we exploit the indicator of im-
porting time from the World Bank Doing Business database. This indicator measures
time to import in days in the destination country. This time includes time for obtaining,
preparing and submitting documents during port or border handling, customs clearance
and inspection procedures. From the French exporters' point of view this indicator repre-
sents time to export. We therefore call this variable exporting time. As this indicator is
only available from 2011, we keep the values of 2011 as reference for our estimations. 4
2.2 Measuring ﬁnancial frictions
Financial ratios. In our empirical study we exploit several indicators of ﬁrms' ﬁnancial
frictions. Following previous works in the literature, we use three ratios computed from
ﬁrms' balance sheet: the liquidity ratio (Liquidityit), the collateral ratio (Collateralit) and
the ﬁnancial charges (FinChargesit ). These indicators have been previously used in the
literature but because of data limitations they were rarely used together in the same study.
Here, thanks to the richness of our data we can alternatively exploit these three indicators
and thus obtain a comprehensive estimation of the eﬀects of ﬁrms' ﬁnancial frictions on
their exports.
3More information are available on the internet at www.cepii.fr
4More information are available on the internet at http://www.doingbusiness.org
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We deﬁne Liquidityit as the ratio of short-term liabilities over short-term assets. This vari-
able measures a liquidity constraint, a high level of liquidity ratio means that the ﬁrm's
short-term debt is higher than its short-term assets. The ﬁrm may therefore encounter
diﬃculties to ﬁnance investment and this may also lead to a restricted access to external
ﬁnance. This variable has been previously used by several authors but results remain in-
conclusive. Minetti and Zhu (2011) and Askenazy et al. (2015) conclude that low levels of
liquidity materialize a restricted access to external ﬁnance and negatively aﬀects ﬁrms ex-
port activities. Berman and Héricourt (2010) conclude to an insigniﬁcant eﬀect of liquidity
on ﬁrms' export participation. Givord and al. (2008) suggest an a speciﬁc interpretation
of liquidity ratio in the case of French ﬁrms. They show that compared to ﬁrms from other
industrialized countries, French ﬁrms may use short-term assets as precautionary savings
because they have a restricted access to bank credit. A low level of liquidity ratio may
reﬂect simultaneously a low level of short-term liabilities and a high level of short-term as-
sets. In that case a low level of liquidity ratio should be interpreted as a credit constraint.
The indicator Collateralit is deﬁned as the ratio of total assets over tangible assets. This
variable reﬂects the ability for a ﬁrm i to raise external ﬁnance. Deﬁned this way it means
that the higher level of this variable is, the more ﬁnancial constrained ﬁrm i is. Indeed, a
low level of tangible assets should restrict the access to external ﬁnance.
The variable FinChargesit is computed as the ratio of ﬁnancial charges over turnover.
This variable reﬂects the dependence of ﬁrm i to external ﬁnance. Based on results found
by previous empirical studies we expect this variable to be negatively correlated to the
volume of exports.
Payment incidents. We complement these variables with other measures of ﬁnancial
frictions coming from the Payment Incident database produced by the Banque de France.
We ﬁrst compute an indicator Firm − PIit that measures the yearly amount of payment
incidents generated by ﬁrm i over its turnover. This indicator reﬂects the diﬃculties ex-
perienced by a ﬁrm to pay its French trading partners. The negative impact of ﬁrms'
payment incident on access to credit has been demonstrated by Aghion et al. (2012). We
consider this variable more precise than the ﬁnancial measures presented above since it
reﬂects realised ﬁnancial shocks while ﬁnancial ratios approximate ﬁnancial shocks. While
previous works exploiting this database were using a dummy variable indicating if the ﬁrm
has witnessed any payment incident over the year, in this work we use a continuous indi-
cator by computing the amount of payment incidents over the year. We derive a second
indicator from this database. We deﬁne Partners− PIit as the yearly amount of ﬁrm i's
partners payment incidents (generated by the ﬁrm's trading partners) over its turnover. As
the database contains the ﬁrm identiﬁer of both the debtor and the creditor, we are able
to identify ﬁrms which have failed to pay a bill to any of the French exporters in our data.
This way we are able to identify external ﬁnancial frictions that aﬀect French exporters.
We consider this second indicator as an exogenous measure of ﬁrms' ﬁnancial frictions since
it captures the ﬁnancial shocks experienced by ﬁrm i independently from its own activities.
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Table 1 provides the correlation coeﬃcients among the ﬁve variables of ﬁrms' ﬁnancial
frictions. Most of the variables are positively correlated, only the indicator Liquidityit is
negatively correlated with most other ﬁnancial frictions variables. This latter ﬁnding is
consistent with Givord et al. (2008) in the case of France. Even if this table shows mainly
positive correlations among those ﬁve alternative measures of ﬁrms' ﬁnancial frictions, it
therefore asserts the relevance of the use of these various measures as their levels of corre-
lation are very low.
Table 1: Correlation between ﬁrms' ﬁnancial frictions variables
Liquidityit Collateralit FinChargesit Firm− PIit Partners− PIit
Liquidityit 1.000
Collateralit -0.189 1.000
FinChargesit -0.013 0.246 1.000
Firm− PIit 0.033 0.007 0.021 1.000
Partners− PIit -0.010 0.046 0.044 0.062 1.000
Note: authors' computation from BRN and Payment Incident databases over the period 1995-2007. All coeﬃcients are
signiﬁcant at 1% level. Variables are all taken in logarithm. The number of observations is 4,700,082 including 152,169 ﬁrms.
2.3 A ﬁrst glance at the data
This section provides statistics describing ﬁrms of our sample. The resulting data is an
unbalanced panel containing 152,169 ﬁrms, on average 51,700 by year over 1995-2007. This
sample is representative of the French economy as it includes ﬁrms of all sizes and all sec-
tors exporting to 189 destination countries. Our ﬁnal sample represents around 85% of
French total exports over the period.
Table 2 shows that on average a ﬁrm exports a yearly amount of 257.33 K euros to a
destination j while its yearly export sales - including all the destinations served - amounts
to 23, 037 K euros. In our sample, the average export share - measured by the ratio of
export sales over total sales - is around 33%. Regarding the ﬁnancial variables, we see that
on average a ﬁrm has a liquidity ratio of 0.47 meaning that its current liabilities are backed
by a larger amount of short-term assets. The mean value of the collateral ratio indicates
that around two thirds of ﬁrms' assets are made of tangible assets, even if there is some
variance between ﬁrms, depending among others of the sector. The variance of export sales
also reﬂects a high level of heterogeneity among ﬁrms. Indeed, as it is well documented in
the literature, our statistcis conﬁrm that a small fraction of big ﬁrms represent the vast
majority of French exports. We could complement this table with two interesting features:
in our sample, 18.3% of observations have generated a payment incident and 22.3% of
observations have suﬀered from some payment incidents generated by their partners.
8
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Table 2: Firms' characteristics and ﬁnancial frictions variables
Firm characteristics p25 mean p50 p75 sd
Turnover 3,184 64,518 9,654 33,765 286,622
Export ﬂow 5.53 257.33 24.40 122.97 816.05
Export sales 317 23,037 1,727 9,299 113,017
Export share 0.061 0.335 0.224 0.499 0.657
Total assets 2,312 76,818 7,794 31,271 537,934
Number of employees 15 248 45 156 1,722
Labour productivity 38.249 61.752 51.797 72.750 38.525
Financial frictions variables
Liquidity ratio 0.326 0.472 0.449 0.590 0.204
Collateral ratio 1.280 1.708 1.505 1.892 0.667
Financial charges 4.62E-07 8.78E-06 2.10E-06 8.04E-06 1.86E-05
Note: authors' computation from BRN, customs and Payment Incident databases over the period 1995-2007. All monetary
variables are expressed in thousands euros. Export ﬂow corresponds to the yearly amount of ﬁrm exports to country j.
Export sales is the yearly amount of exports at the ﬁrm level. Export share is computed as the ratio of export sales over
turnover. The number of observations is 4,700,082 including 152,169 ﬁrms.
3 Empirical methodology
3.1 Baseline speciﬁcation
Our aim is to study the role of ﬁnancial frictions on the volume of exports to a single
destination. For this purpose we want to estimate the following model:
EXisjt = βFinFrictionit + µi[+γst][+γs + γt] + γjt + it (1)
where EXisjt represents the sum of exports of ﬁrm i belonging to sector s to country j over
the year t. FinFrictionit stands for the level of ﬁrm i's ﬁnancial frictions observed during
year t. In our study we exploit several measures of ﬁnancial frictions that are described
in the previous section. µi denotes ﬁrm-speciﬁc unobserved characteristics.We include two
combinations of ﬁxed eﬀects. The ﬁrst one includes γst and γjt that represent sector-year
and country-year ﬁxed eﬀects capturing respectively sector speciﬁc and destination speciﬁc
shocks. Controlling for sector-year speciﬁc shocks that may aﬀect export trade volumes is
essential to get an accurate estimation. The second combination of ﬁxed eﬀects keeps γjt
and introduce γs and γt to capture respectively time-invariant characteristics across sectors
and speciﬁc time events common to all ﬁrms. Our coeﬃcient of interest is β, we expect
it to be negative since the literature has provided a large body of evidence that ﬁnancial
frictions negatively aﬀect the level of exports. In the estimations all variables are taken
in logarithm. Many exporting ﬁrms in the sample observe zero values for the variables
Firm−PIit and Partners−PIit we therefore take the log of one plus the amount af these
variables.
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Control variables. With this speciﬁcation we account for unobserved heterogeneity with
various control variables Xkit. Using control variables helps us to precisely disentangle the
eﬀect of ﬁrms' ﬁnancial frictions on their export volumes. We control for size with the
amount of total assets and the number of employees of ﬁrm i at time t. As shown in the
literature size is a key determinant both for export volumes and access to ﬁnance. We
also control for ﬁrms' productivity by using the level of labour productivity (measured by
value added per employee). The role of ﬁrms' productivity on export activities has been
largely attested by recent works. Finally, we control for ﬁrms' group linkages by using
information from the LIFI survey. We deﬁne four dummy variables to account for the four
diﬀerent status (deatiled in section 2.1). The ﬁrm can be the head of a group, or part of a
group, in the periphery of a group or independent. Belonging to a group or being part of a
consortium of ﬁrms may help the ﬁrm to export by taking beneﬁt of existing distribution
networks abroad, or may inﬂuence its access to external ﬁnance.
Fixed eﬀects. We use sector-year dummy variables to control for sector speciﬁc shocks.
It therefore captures all the time-varying changes at the sector level that may aﬀect ﬁrms'
export volumes or access to ﬁnance. We identify ﬁrms' industry through their main activity
reported in their balance sheet, one ﬁrm is associated to only one sector but may change of
industry over time. Industries are then deﬁned using the NAF rev. 2 classiﬁcation at the
2-digit level. We also introduce country-year dummy variables to account for time varying
changes at the destination country level that are relevant for our estimation. For example,
it capture changes of the demand on the destination market or exchange rate moves. We
alternatively use country-year or country and year dummies to control for country time
invariant characteristics such as geographic factors, cultural factors, etc. Year dummies
capture shocks that aﬀect all the countries over the same year, as a global ﬁnancial shock
for instance.
Endogeneity issues. Endogeneity is a concern in equation (1), an estimation of our
coeﬃcient β might be biased. Indeed, there is a concern of reverse causality since we
cannot exclude the possibility that export sales aﬀect ﬁrms' ﬁnancial frictions. The re-
lationship between ﬁrms' export sales and ﬁnancial frictions may be simultaneous and
therefore threatens the validity of the estimated baseline model. To tackle this issue we
would process instrumental regressions detailed in the next section. One might think of
another source of endogeneity, namely the omitted variable bias. We cannot rule out the
possibility that ﬁrms' export sales correlate with unobserved ﬁrms' characteristics and our
instrumentation strategy deals with this concern.
3.2 Instrumentation
As explained in the previous section our baseline estimated model may suﬀer from an
endogeneity bias because of reverse causality. To tackle this issue we need to use an
exogenous measure of ﬁrms' ﬁnancial frictions. The Payment Incident database described
10
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in section 2 provides us this crucial indicator to measure exogenous ﬁnancial frictions: the
indicator Partners − PIit. Indeed we expect that when ﬁrm i's trading partners fail to
pay it, this payment failure directly aﬀects ﬁrm i's ﬁnancial health. And these payment
failures on ﬁrm i are fully exogenous, meaning that they are fully independent to its export
sales. The variable Partners− PIit is exogenous to ﬁrm i export strategy.
We estimate an instrumented model where the various indicators FinFrictionit are
instrumented by the variable Partners− PIit. We estimate this model processing a 2SLS
estimation with the same control variables and ﬁxed eﬀects as in the baseline speciﬁca-
tion. In all estimations, standard errors are clustered at the ﬁrm*year level and robust to
heteroscedasticity.
3.3 Trading time interaction
Trading time and ﬁnancial frictions. To complement our analysis of the impact of
ﬁrms' ﬁnancial frictions on export sales, we focus on the speciﬁc eﬀect of trading time
on this relationship. The question of trading time as a trade barrier has been largely
studied in the literature but the analysis of the speciﬁc eﬀect of trading time on exporters
facing ﬁnancial frictions is new. As discussed in the introduction, a strand of literature
focuses on the role of distance or shipping time on ﬁrms' exports but they do not consider
the particular case of ﬁnancially distressed exporters. We motivate the analysis of this
question by simply arguing that trading time may reinforce the eﬀect of ﬁnancial frictions.
This reinforcing eﬀect is suggested by a few papers (Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2011), Berman
et al. (2015), Manova et al. (2013) and Feenstra et al. (2015)). Firms facing ﬁnancial
frictions are more vulnerable and they may be forced to adjust their export strategy. Since
we focus on the volumes of export sales, we consider that ﬁrms witnessing ﬁnancial distress
may decide to reduce their exports to some destinations. They would adjust to this shock
through their intensive margin because they lack ﬁnancial capacities to maintain their
previous levels of exports. Here, the question we ask is: do exporters facing ﬁnancial
frictions reduce their exports to markets characterized by long trading time? Our ﬁrst
intuition is simply that longer trading time is costlier because it requires longer shipping
time, which is equivalent to higher opportunity costs. In the meanwhile we know that
these faraway markets (in terms of geographic distance or exporting time) are very hard to
reach because it requires a high level of ﬁxed costs to enter. Firms need to invest time and
money to learn about the market, they may need to invest in R&D to adapt their product
to the speciﬁcities of the market, they need to develop a distribution network, etc. All
these ﬁxed costs are higher for faraway destinations. Therefore, an alternative strategy in
case of ﬁnancial frictions might be to reduce export volumes to closer markets where ﬁxed
costs associated to the export activities are lower. Consequently, the eﬀect of trading time
on exporters witnessing ﬁnancial frictions remains inconclusive. By estimating this eﬀect
we provide new evidence on this question.
Table 3 gives the extra-Europe top-20 destinations served by ﬁrms from our sample, the
volumes exported and the distance ﬁgures associated to these destinations. We focus on
extra-Europe destinations to get a better idea which are the key long distance markets for
11
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French exporters. Here we see that on average 12,239 ﬁrms from our sample sell to the
US o each year over the period (there are more than 18,000 to export to Germany); they
are less than 7,000 to export to Japan which is one of the furthest destination. We also
see that while Russia is closer in terms of distance to France than China, it requires 12
additional days to export to this country. This table clearly shows that the two proxies of
trading time (distance and exporting time) provide complementary information.
Table 3: Top 20 destinations extra Europe
Country Export
(millions e)
Distance
(Km)
Exporting time
(days)
Exporting ﬁrms
(N)
United States 4,679.8 5,838 5 12,239
Japan 2,107.3 9,726 11 6,537
Algeria 1,568.1 1,340 13 7,274
Tunisia 1,550.2 1,484 17 8,542
Morocco 1,529.8 1,817 17 8,975
Turkey 1,274.9 2,256 15 4,776
Canada 1,255.2 6,005 11 5,912
China 1,246.6 8,225 24 3,457
Russia 1,099.6 2,494 36 3,350
Hong Kong 1,026.5 9,639 5 4,617
South Korea 977.4 8,981 7 3,411
Brazil 861.5 9,408 17 3,019
Australia 857.7 16,975 8 3,698
Mexico 734.1 9,207 12 2,409
Senegal 725.9 10,748 4 3,391
Taiwan 723.6 9,834 12 3,290
United Arab emirates 703.8 5,250 7 3,567
Saoudi Arabia 679.8 4,695 17 3,148
Israel 663.7 3,282 10 4,441
South Africa 640.4 9,354 35 2,928
Note: authors' computation from BRN, customs and Payment Incident databases over the period 1995-2007. The statistics
reported in the table above are the yearly average of each variable over the period 1995-2007.
Interaction model. We therefore estimate the following model by interacting ﬁnancial
frictions and trading time:
EXijt = β1(FinFrictionit) + β2(FinFrictionit) ∗ TradingT imeit + β3TradingT imeit
+ βkXkit + [+γst][+γs + γt] + +γjt + ε (2)
when estimating this model we keep the same indicators of FinFrictionit as in the
baseline model, we also keep the same controls and ﬁxed eﬀects. The novelty comes from
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the interaction terms, in this speciﬁcation the variable FinFrictionit is interacted by a
dummy variable TradingT imeit. This latter variable relates to a geographic distance
indicator (called longDistit) or alternatively to an indicator measuring exporting time
(called longExTimeit). To build longDistit we compute at the ﬁrm-level the average
distance of all exports realised by a ﬁrm i during year t. We then compute the median of
this variable across the ﬁrms of our sample and deﬁne the dummy variable longDistit that
equals to one if the average distance travelled by a ﬁrm's yearly exports is higher than the
median; and to zero otherwise.
Similarly we compute the ﬁrm-level average exporting time (in days) associated to all
exports realised by ﬁrm i during year t. We then deﬁne longExTimeit equals to one if the
average exporting time associated with a ﬁrm's yearly exports is higher than the median;
and to zero otherwise. On average, ﬁrms' export travel 1,900Km and require 15 days to
reach the destination.5
4 Results
4.1 Baseline results
Table 4 shows the results of the estimated baseline model using the ﬁve alternative mea-
sures of ﬁrms' ﬁnancial frictions. Each column corresponds to one distinct measure of
ﬁrms' ﬁnancial frictions as explanatory variable. We clearly see that our results are very
signiﬁcant (at the 1% level) and in line with our expectations. In column (1) liquidity ratio
is positively correlated with the level of ﬁrms' export sales. A higher liquidity constraint
corresponds to higher levels of export sales. This result might be surprising, even though
evidence was not conclusive on the eﬀect of liquidity on exports. We might have thought
that a higher level of liquidity ratio corresponds to a restricted access to external ﬁnance
and therefore lower export sales. This mechanism is not asserted by our estimations but
are in line with results from Givord et al. (2008) already mentioned in section 2.2. With
column (2) we see that ﬁrms having lower tangible assets export less, it conﬁrms previous
results in the literature. Low levels of tangible assets materialize a credit constraint and
therefore hinders exporters to ﬁnance variable costs of exporting. Complementary to this
result with column (3) we ﬁnd that ﬁrms paying higher amounts of ﬁnancial charges export
less.
The other measures of ﬁrms' ﬁnancial frictions computed from the Payment Incidents
database complement these ﬁrst results. According to column (4) exporters having gen-
erated signiﬁcant payment incidents on their trading partners export signiﬁcanlty fewer
volumes. This latter may be coherent with the results from column (5). We have a great
interest for these last results since the variable Partners− PIit is used for the ﬁrst time.
5One interesting feature of the indicator of exporting time is its level of dispersion. The ﬁrm-level
average exporting time exhibits a standard deviation more than 8 times the one associated to the ﬁrm-
level average distance.
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This variable captures the level of payment incidents that have aﬀected each ﬁrm i, it
measures exogenously ﬁrms' ﬁnancial frictions. We see that exporters having been hit by
large amount of payment incidents witness lower levels of export sales. This negative eﬀect
signiﬁcantly reduces the level of export sales. The coeﬃcients associated to the variables
Firm− PIit (-7.5) and Partners− PIit (-27.9) are much higher than the ones associated
to the other measures of ﬁrms' ﬁnancial frictions and they should not be interpreted as
elasticities. This is explained by the way we measure payment incidents6.
We note that coeﬃcients associated to control variables are all signiﬁcant and in line
with what has been previously found in the literature. Bigger ﬁrms (measured by their
total assets) and more productive ﬁrms export more. One might be surprised to see that
in our regressions the size of the labour force is negatively correlated with export sales.
This may be due to a high correlation (more than 80%) between the variables number of
employees and total assets. Indeed this negative sign turns positive if we only include the
number of employees as control instead of including both the number of employees and the
amount of total assets. However, we prefer including these two variables simultaneously as
control variables to account better for unobserved heterogeneity among ﬁrms.
4.2 Instrumentation results
Our baseline results are highly signiﬁcant and in line with what is found in the literature
but we cannot exclude that those results might be biased because of endogeneity. This issue
has been detailed in section 3. Table 5 presents the results of the 2SLS estimations where
we instrument each measure of ﬁrms's ﬁnancial frictions by the variable Partners− PIit.
Each column from (1) to (4) and from (5) to (8) presents the results for the four alter-
native measures of ﬁrms' ﬁnancial frictions. Columns (1) to (4) correspond to regressions
including sector*year and country*year ﬁxed eﬀects and columns (5) to (8) to regressions
including year, sector and country*year ﬁxed eﬀects.
Results in columns (1) and (5) conﬁrm that liquidity is positively correlated with export
sales, even when we instrument this measure of ﬁrms' ﬁnancial frictions with the variable
Partners − PIit. Instrumentation does not change the estimated eﬀect of liquidity on
export sales we ﬁnd for our sample. Columns (2) and (6) corroborate that a low level of
tangible assets prevents ﬁrms from exporting much. Columns (3) and (7) present results
associated with the variable FinChargesit and show that a higher amount of ﬁnancial
charges is negatively related to the level of ﬁrms' export sales. Finally, the results of our
main interest are the ones from column (4) and (8). As found in our baseline estimation
6We estimate the model by tatking the log of 1+Firm − PIit and the log of 1+Partners − PIit.
Therefore, as the ratio of payment incident over turnover is very close to zero when taking the diﬀerential
of the variable (1+PI) we obtain something very close to zero. Consequently the coeﬃcient measuring
dx
x
d(PI)
(PI)
is high as the denominator is close to zero
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we clearly see a negative and strong impact of ﬁrms' own payment incidents on their level
of exports. With this 2SLS estimation, we tackle the endogeneity issue and clearly ﬁnd
that ﬁrms witnessing ﬁnancial frictions and being unable to pay their bill to one or more
trading partners have lower levels of export sales. In all the 2SLS estimations the strength
of our instrument variable is conﬁrmed by the Kleibergen-Paap statistic. This statistic is
the heteroskedastic and clustering robust version of the Cragg-Donald statistic provided
by Stock and Yogo (2005). This is a test for weak instruments, the value of this statistic
should be greater than the 10% level critical value of 16.38. As all the columns show a
level of this statistic greater thant the critical value, our results conﬁrm that the variable
Partners−PIit is a strong instrument for other measures of ﬁrms' ﬁnancial frictions. We
note that coeﬃcients from the control variables are highly signiﬁcant and as for the baseline
results, we observe that the number of employees is negatively correlated with export sales.
This might be unexpected but it may be explained by a high correlation of this variable
with the amount of total assets.
Overall results from the 2SLS estimations conﬁrm the ones obtained with our baseline
estimations. One might be surprised by the very high magnitude of some coeﬃcients asso-
ciated to ﬁnancial frictions variables, especially the one of the indicator Firm−PIit. This
magnitude simply reﬂects the low magnitude of the coeﬃcient associated to the variable
Firm−PIit in the ﬁrst-stage regression (presented in Appendix B). Indeed, the coeﬃcient
associated to the eﬀect of Partners − PIit (the instrument variable) on Firm − PIit is
very small (around 0.008, cf. table 10 in Appendix B). We therefore end up with a high
coeﬃcient in the second stage (cf. columns (4) and (8) of table 5 the coeﬃcient is greater
than 3,600 in absolute terms). 7
4.3 Trading Time interaction results
Distance Interaction. Table 6 presents results of the estimations including the inter-
action of ﬁrms' ﬁnancial frictions with distance, it corresponds to the model described
by equation 2. As presented in section 3.3 these estimations aim at capturing the eﬀect
of trading time proxied by distance in reinforcing the negative impact of ﬁrms' ﬁnancial
frictions on export sales. Column (1) shows results slightly diﬀerent from previous results
using liquidity as a variable of ﬁrms' ﬁnancial frictions. Firms with a higher liquidity rtio
do not export less than the others but it is less true for ﬁrms exporting to further destina-
tions. Indeed the coeﬃcient of the interaction term is negative although the total eﬀect of
liquidity on export sales (it corresponds to the sum of the coeﬃcients β1 and β2) remains
positive. The positive values for β3 may signal a favorable selection eﬀect, not taken into
account by control variables. There would be a positive signal on performance sent by the
exporter to potential ﬁnancers when selling to remote destinations. Yet, the negative β2
coeﬃcient of the interaction between ﬁnancial frictions and distance indicates at the same
time that ﬁnancial frictions are all the more detrimental to exports as distnace increases.
7This is explained by the fact that β2SLS =
dy/dz
dx/dz
with y referring to the dependent variable, x to the
instrumented variable and z to the instrument variable.
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Column (2) shows that when measured with the variable Collateralit, ﬁrms' ﬁnancial fric-
tions have a negative impact on ﬁrms export sales and this eﬀect is signiﬁcantly higher
for ﬁrms exporting to faraway destinations. Results in column (3) conﬁrm this pattern
but with coeﬃcients of lower magnitude. The negative eﬀect of ﬁnancial charges on ex-
port is lower than when ﬁrms' ﬁnancial frictions are measured with a collateral constraint.
Column (4) presents results in line with the ones associated to the variable Firm − PIit
using the baseline speciﬁcation. We clearly see that ﬁrms witnessing ﬁnancial frictions
and generating payment incidents export less, and this is even more true for ﬁrms export-
ing to further destinations. Finally, column (5) presents the results of our main interest.
This column shows that ﬁrms having witnessed payment incidents generated by their trad-
ing partners export less, and this eﬀect is higher for ﬁrms exporting to further destinations.
All the results presented above conﬁrm the reinforcing eﬀect of trading time (proxied
by distance) on the negative impact of ﬁrms facing ﬁnancial frictions on export sales. This
eﬀect appears particularly strong when we use the payment incident indicators to measure
ﬁrms' ﬁnancial frictions. To complement these results we exploit an alternative indicator
of trading time, a measure of exporting time (in days) described in section 3.3.
Exporting Time interaction results. Table 7 shows the results of the estimations of
model (2) using exporting time as a proxy for trading time.8 These results are broadly
comparable to the previous onesn taking into account standard errors. They depict a
stronger eﬀect of trading time in reinforcing the negative impact of ﬁrms' ﬁnancial frictions
on export sales. Columns (1) and (6) present results showing that ﬁrms with a higher
liquidity constraint do not reduce their export sales while the ones exporting to further
destinations do. Columns (2) and (7) bear out the negative impact of a collateral constraint
on ﬁms' export sales and this impact is magniﬁed by longer exporting time. With results
presented in columns (3) and (8), we see that a high level of ﬁnancial charges is negatively
correlated with ﬁrms' export sales and the reinforcing eﬀect of exporting time is close to
zero. Results in columns (4) and (9) reaﬃrm the strong eﬀect of ﬁrms' payment incidents
on ﬁrms' export volumes and this eﬀect is largely ampliﬁed by longer exporting times.
The more striking result is displayed in columns (5) and (10) where we see that ﬁrms
suﬀering from payment incidents generated by their partners reduce their export sales
with a coeﬃcient of the Partners−PIit variable equal to around -22 for ﬁrms exporting in
average to close destinations and around -38 9 for ﬁrms exporting to remote destinations.
For these latest ﬁrms, the negative eﬀect of ﬁnancial frictions is almost doubled due to
remoteness, even if the positive signal sent by remote exports smooths out somewhat this
negative eﬀect (coeﬃcient of the variable of long exporting time equal to 0.243).
8Results in Table 7 are estimated on a slightly smaller sample of countries as the indicator of exporting
time is not available for 18 countries.
9 This coeﬃcient corresponds to the sum of β1 and β2 i.e -38=-22.471-15.232
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5 Additional results
5.1 Single-destination exporters
The literature studying exporters has emphasized that most exporters export only to one
single market. This result has been conﬁrmed with French data by Eaton and al. (2014)
who ﬁnd that more than 30% of French exporters exactly export to only one destination.
To test that our results are robust to the case of the average French exporting ﬁrm, we
perform the same regressions on the subsample of single-destination exporters.
OLS estimations Table 8 shows results of the OLS model estmated on the subsample
of single-destination exporters. Results are very similar to the baseline ones, although we
end up with a signiﬁcant lower number of observations.
2SLS estimations We complement the OLS estimation by performing 2SLS estima-
tions on the subsample of single-destination exporters. Results are presented in table 9.
The coeﬃcients β of the main variables of interest are in the whole comparable to the
ones in table 5 (especially when considering the magnitudes of standard errors) and thus
results seem to be robust, except for the liquidity ratio variables10. One should notice
that the Kleibergen-Paap statistics signals that the Partners−PIit variable is no longer a
strong instrument for the Liquidityit variable in this restricted sub-sample of single-market
exporters.
6 Conclusion
Firms' ﬁnancial frictions have a signiﬁcant impact on ﬁrms' export sales. Throughout this
study we estimate this impact by exploiting various indicators of ﬁrms' ﬁnancial frictions.
We ﬁnd that ﬁrms' ﬁnancial frictions signiﬁcantly reduce export sales. We exploit a unique
instrument to exogenously measure ﬁrms' ﬁnancial frictions that allows us to tackle the
issue of endogeneity. Finally, we investigate the speciﬁc role of trading time proxied al-
ternatively by distance and an indicator of exporting time and an interesting pattern has
emerged from this analysis. Our results support for a reinforcing eﬀect of trading time on
the negative eﬀect of ﬁrms' ﬁnancial frictions on their export volumes.
We believe that our analysis provides new insight on the key role of ﬁnance for exporters.
Our ﬁnding would plead for policies to ease access to ﬁnance for exporters and in this way
foster export performance in developed economies. If the ﬁndings related to French frims
10Coeﬃcients associated to control variables in table 9 all appear with a negative signs in column (3) and
(4). This might be surprising but it is no longer the case when we exclude one of these control variables in
the estimation. This latter notice should not change the interpretation of our results as we consider these
variables only as control variables
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can be transposedto other countries, our results also provide a support to improve trading
process across countries by improving administrative processes and logistics infrastructure.
Appendices
A List of variables
Variable name Description
Exportijst ﬁrm-level export sales in sector s by destination j over year t
Liquidityit ﬁrm-level ratio of short-term liabilities over short-term assets at year
t.
Collateralit ﬁrm-level ratio of total assets over tangible assets at year t.
FinChargesit ﬁrm-level ratio of ﬁnancial charges over turnover at year t.
Firm− PIit ﬁrm-level amount of payment incidents generated by ﬁrm i over
turnover at year t. We estimate the model with ln(1+ratio).
Partners− PIit ﬁrm-level amount of ﬁrm i's partners payment incidents (generated
by the ﬁrm's trading partners) over turnover at year t. We estimate
the model with ln(1+ratio).
Total assets ﬁrm-level amount of total assets at year t.
Nb of employees total number of employees of ﬁrm i at year t.
Productivity ﬁrm-level value added per employee at year t.
Group this variable controls for ﬁrms belonging to a group. We deﬁne
four dummy variables to identify if a ﬁrm is a head of a group, a
subsidiary, in the periphery of a group or independent.
longDist this dummy variable eqals 1 if the average distance travelled by a
ﬁrm's yearly exports is higher than the median and 0 otherwise.
longExTime this dummy variable eqals 1 if the average exporting time associated
to a ﬁrm's yearly exports is higher than the median and 0 otherwise.
B First-stage results
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